southern edge of the Po Valley. It is the site of what some claim to be Europe's oldest university. This is far from being its sole claim to fame (Cobban, 1992) . In 1988, Bologna saw the universities of Europe come together to sign the Magna Charta Universitatum, otherwise known as the Great University Charter. The charter aired certain fundamental values of the university: academic freedom, the freedom to teach and to learn, and with it, university autonomy. In June 1999, 11 years later, Bologna was host to the signing of the so-called Bologna Declaration, a document to which ministers of higher education of no fewer than 29 European states set their hands. Given that only 15 member states made up the European Union at that moment, this was an amazing feat.
In this article, I will examine what is commonly alluded to by technicians, experts, and civil servants de tout poil as the Bologna Process. I will use this process to explore some of the ticklish issues that Euroland faces in its bid to construct that no less bureaucratic entity called the European Higher Education Area, shortly to be supplemented by what the technocratic mind is now calling the European Research Area.
However, my purpose lies elsewhere-namely, to lay bare some of the assumptions, the takens-for-granted beneath the various major systems of higher education in Western Europe. Precisely because Europe is engaged in reconstructing higher education, these systems now face severe challenge. I will examine some of the tensions certain assumptions have created in the ongoing saga of reconstruction, more particularly those that relate to one of the basic issues in higher education-namely, the community to which the university is answerable and how it is answerable.
THE ISSUE OF COMPLEMENTARITY
Not surprisingly, many of these issues have a familiar ring. Accountability is one. Accreditation and quality assurance are others. Indeed, the general context of negotiating the complementarity between different patterns of provision in higher education and the mechanisms, technical and legal, by which that complementarity is upheld and ensured, I presume to be largely a matter of well-honed routine in the United States, although not without tensions between the state and the federal level. Still, complementarity-that is, the way one system of higher education may serve to extend the opportunities absent in another-viewed from the standpoint of the different nation-state patterns of higher education in Euroland, is highly novel and the source of enormous friction. For although it is not wholly an abstraction to talk about an American higher education system, it is most certainly so when one talks about a European higher education system. Still, official documents increasingly allude to this metaphysical entity-more, one suspects, as a strange object of desire than as an achieved state of fact.
There is good reason for this situation. It has to do primarily with that long revolution that, depending on the particular national setting one takes, may, in the case of France and Germany, be traced back to the earlier part of the 19th century. It involved the gradual assimilation of higher education as part of the state services in the modernizing nation-state. 1 
STATE, NATION, AND HIGHER EDUCATION:
A EUROPEAN FIRST Two points should be retained in connection with this long, drawn-out process, which arguably only ran its course 20 years or so ago. First, in Europe, the ties between state and higher education developed earliest and have been the longest in place. For that reason, it is all the more difficult to dissolve them, although clearly dissolution-whether one dubs it "internationalization" or "globalization"-is on the wing (Huisman, Maassen, & Neave, 2001) . Second, the development of the university as a complex organization and as a "research university" went hand in hand with its assimilation as a state service. Arguably Europe's initial steps toward the massification of higher education during the 1960s merely strengthened the ties between state and university, most especially in funding, building, and the provision of places (Geiger, 1986) .
NATIONALIZATION AND THE REFERENTIAL COMMUNITY
This long-term dynamic, viewed from outside, may appear as another version of nationalization, the spreading of the heavy claw of national administration. It would be an error, however, to dismiss it out of hand. It gives insight, although indirect, into precisely the nature of the community to which higher education in Western Europe is held responsible. From a perspective both historical and comparative, that community was defined very differently in mainland Europe than in either Britain or the United States. The community to which higher education answered was national-not regional and very certainly not local. The nationalization of higher education as a service, provided and regulated by the state to the nation, formed one of the prior conditions by which higher education was set firmly within the public domain. To that extent, nationalization of Europe's universities laid down the basic parameters of what today could be construed as accountability. That the individual university was held to be part of the state's service to the nation had other consequences, too. Formally, all universities were held to be of similar status, a condition bemusing to visitors of German and French establishments, ancient and modern! It also explains the absence of any attempt by authorities to rank universities, despite efforts by journalists and researchers over the past decade in both France and Germany (Teichler, 1998) .
That the nation is the community to which the university is answerable also explains some of the more marked differences between mainland Europe on one hand and Britain and the United States on the other.
COMMUNITIES: NATIONAL AND LOCAL
Interpretations that grew up around the national community on one hand and the local community on the other are many and various. Broadly speaking, among those countries that interpret higher education as inseparable from the national community are France, Italy, Spain, and Sweden. Often cast in terms of a "Napoleonic" relationship between university, government, and society, this model saw the individual establishment bonded into the national community by dint of close oversight exercised by a central ministry. It was also underpinned by the principle of legal homogeneity-that is, the uniform application of legislation to the same type of establishment across the breadth and depth of the land (Neave & van Vught, 1994) . Central amongst those dimensions that gave operational expression to the university as part of a national community was the practice of state-accredited and statevalidated diplomas as opposed to university-awarded diplomas. This duality, still present in France, Germany, and Belgium, sometimes entailed close oversight over those curricular pathways that lead to careers in public service, a characteristic particularly strong in those systems that derived from the French model of referential system.
2
Other interpretations about the particular community to which the university is answerable flourish. They are no less historically determined and rest on a contrary assumption. They place a limited role on national administration in higher education and very particularly in validating degrees, their content, and most especially the organization of and powers attributed to governing bodies (Neave, 2000, p. 6) . Such a construct prevails in Britain and the United States.
The Anglo-Saxon interpretation of the historic community to which the university is answerable rests on two dimensions: first, the belief that the relationship between government and university ought not to be proximate; and second, the view that the principle of proximity should most assuredly apply to the community to which the university should be answerable-namely, to the local community.
The key concept that underlines the Anglo-Saxon relationship between government and community-and the university by extension-is therefore one of distance and separation.
3 Such a view is reflected in a remark by the German American political scientist Carl Landauer during the mid-1960s uproar at the University of California: "The issue is not to render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's. The issue is to keep Caesar at bay" (as quoted in Rosovsky, 2001, p. 6) . The Napoleonic interpretation of the place of the university in society emphasized close legal and administrative ties between nation and university, constructed around a national community. By contrast, the Anglo-American interpretation set equal stress on physical proximity, on close ties of the university with the local community, and with direct representation of local interests in shaping the university's mission and responsibilities.
By defining the referential community-that is, the community to which the individual university should be answerable-as the "national collectivity" or the local community, administrative practice and constitutional theory also defined the proper relationship between university and society. Likewise, they also set in place a system of protection designed to uphold-at least in principle-the freedom of teaching and learning, protecting them from the temptation that particular interests might have in trying to subordinate the basic mission of the university-that is, ensnaring the universality of knowledge-and turning it aside to their own ends.
THE GUARDIANS
What is often interpreted today as the unacceptable extension of state powers bears another interpretation as an arrangement by which the state, as the supreme expression of the general interest, sought to prevent the unbalancing of that general interest by placing the regulated orders of the academic estate, the administrative estate, and the student estate exclusively within its own purlieu as part of the national community. This arrangement rested on the belief that individual interests-or to use a Gallicism, sectional interests-if allowed to bear down directly on the university, posed a very real threat to the university's ability wholly and exclusively to devote itself to the tasks of advancing learning and scholarship. The fundamental premise beneath this relationship rested on a presumed incompatibility between the university as a state service provided and direct ties between university and outside interests. It reflected the equally fundamental premise that links between university and the world of commerce and industry should be mediated, or filtered, through national administration. National administration was the guardian of the general interest. In effect, earlier relationships between university and society in France and Italy accorded very little legitimacy to external stakeholders seeking to act beyond these bounds.
Here are several clues that explain differences in scope of the referential community in the Anglo-Saxon world from its counterparts in the world of the Napoleonic university. These differences upheld divergent views of about ties between university and community. Whereas the Napoleonic model sought to protect the university from overmighty external interests by the state, the its Anglo-Saxon counterpart sought to protect academia from the state, the better to allow the university to pursue its dealings with external interests (Neave, 2000, p. 10) .
Nationalization had two major consequences. It bonded the university to the national community by nationally standardized procedures-pay scales and conditions of employment for academic (Enders, 2001; Neave & Rhoades, 1987) and administrative staff. National legislation set out-as it still doesconditions of access and admission; defined the terms of accreditation; and, through the use of what is known as the effectis civilis-that is, the right to confer diplomas that carried eligibility for public sector employmentreduced private establishments to marginal, if not vestigial, status.
It is precisely this historic European construct of the national community as the highest level of aggregation and decision making in higher education (Clark, 1983) that stands under duress from two directions: from the emerging supranational level represented by the European Union and from a development less prominent but more advanced than the European Union in shaping higher education policy within individual member states-namely, regionalization.
REGIONALIZATION
The second direction is not always recognized, although momentum has been gathering for two decades or more. It concerns the regionalization of higher education-that is, the devolution of responsibilities, previously exercised by central government, to a series of subnational administrative units and/or authorities. This process began in Sweden in 1977, failed within the decade (Lane, 1992; Premfors, 1985) , then was taken up by Spain with the Organic Law on Higher Education of 1983 (Coombes & Perkins, 1989; Garcia Garrido, 1998) . Subsequently, regionalization has emerged in Belgium, France, and the once United Kingdom. Thus the nation-state, in its historic role as the principal community to which accounts are to be rendered, faces fragmentation. Powers once exercised exclusively in higher education-budget, creation of new establishments, the conferment of the right to award degrees, their authoritative recognition, and in certain instances, the right of final say over senior staff and administrative appointments-migrate elsewhere, some to the subnational level. Others are increasingly constrained where not directly influenced by, Bruxelles's drive to erect a European higher education area.
In today's Euroland, redefining the "community" in higher education involves a three-way contest. First, the tug-of-war between the rising power of subnational regions, hoisted to the level of partners and assuming an increasing financial burden as funding is off-loaded from central national administration. Second, the tensions between the historic definition of the answerable community clustered around the nation-state and the sensitivities the latter has about possible incursions the European Union might be tempted to take in the domain of higher education (de Wit & Verhoeven, 2001 ). Third, the particular vision that the Commission of the European Union entertained about the role and place of higher education in constructing the Union and ensuring its viability as a competitor in the international arena. If analytically separate, in reality the second and third are closely intertwined.
CONTEST AROUND VISIONS
The vision of higher education that emerged from the Commission of the European Union-effectively, the Union's executive arm-was not uncontested. When national identity expresses itself through defending the national language, culture, and the institutional specifics that upheld them, to define all higher education as "vocational," which the European Court of Justice did in 1984, was bold. 4 Certainly, this legal definition provided a formal basis for the Commission to take the initiative, rather than waiting on member states that, in the area of education stricto sensu, were often reticent to do so if not always openly opposed (Brouwer, 1996) .
5 This daring interpretation of higher education's function opened the way to novel programs, such as COMETT, cross-frontier staff and student exchange between higher education and industry. COMETT was implemented fewer than 18 months after the promulgation of the Gravier Judgement of 1984 (Neave, 1987) . It opened the door to student exchange on a mass basis in the form of the ERASMUS program, set up in 1987.
The success of these schemes and those that came after was extraordinary. Today, some 250,000 students in the Union follow courses of a minimum of 3 months' duration in a higher education system other than their own (Kalvermark & van der Wende, 1997) . But for every credit side, there is always a debit. It is important to take account of the less palatable aspect because the tensions it engendered explain much of the true significance of the Bologna Declaration and its often curious if not outright tortuous phraseology.
The often-uneasy relationship between national community and the emerging superordinate layer of influence (coordination would be too strong a term) in Bruxelles was not new. Agreed, the debate reflected a wider discussion in European society that, although circumstances have changed since, tends still to provide a healthy ground for disagreement. It has to do with the relationship between the market and culture within the education policies of individual member states. Inside the Commission, a similar tension existed. How ought Euroland to move from a purely economic community to a fully fledged political union? What part should higher education play in the transformation?
UNEASY ORIGINS
In moving Europe from being a trading bloc to becoming a political entity, a major consideration lay precisely in the area of education and culture. This was an antique issue, first broached in the aftermath of 1968 by Olivier Guichard, a senior French politician and member of the Gaullist party. The absence of education in the Founding Treaties appeared suddenly as an embarrassing oversight. Its inclusion, Guichard argued, could channel the recently misused energies of the younger generation toward the European venture. Without the support of young people, he believed, Europe's future was, at best, precarious. It could not survive simply as an economic community (Neave, 1984) .
Negotiations between member states and Commission resulted in compromise. Member states retained control over education but opened the path up in 1976 for the Commission to put in place a limited Education Action Programme. Two conditions were key to this entente: First, nowhere would the notion of harmonization-that is, moving toward a series of common standards or practices and a central part of the economic construction of Europe-apply to education; and second, implementation of the Education Action Programme was to reside with the individual member state. The business of constructing Europe now officially embraced schools and universities. Education, present in the Commission's organizational chart, nevertheless remained by comparison with agriculture and regional and industrial development in a subordinate position of quasi-financial invisibility. Its programs on language development, remediation for immigrant children, and in higher education, student exchange, stayed small and largely experimental. Nevertheless, a number of principles were established. Lines of demarcation in education between the responsibilities of national communities and those of the European Economic Community were set down. Education and culture remained within the purlieu of the former, a vision largely in keeping with the Gaullist notion of Europe des Patries. Formally speaking, although more as a species of legal fiction, Bruxelles could act only on the invitation of the member states.
FORCES OF CHANGE
Why did this change? What brought this entente to an end? As with so many marker events in history, there is no single explanation. Spiralling youth unemployment during the late 1970s; a third round of enlargement embracing Spain, Greece, and Portugal; and last but not least, the crisis in the European welfare state during the early to late 1980s all played their part. So did international competition and very specifically the conviction that without closer ties between university and industry, Europe risked trailing in two crucial areas: information and communications technology and the rise of the knowledge society. In both, the Commission was well aware of advances in the United States and Japan. Finally, and most significant of all, many Member States realized that a higher education system, drawing up to 90% of its funding from the national budget, could neither accommodate the numbers of students pressing in nor, without conferring a far greater degree of institutional latitude and initiative on individual universities, adapt to the accelerating pace of change.
That many member states were, from 1987 onwards, deeply entangled in root-and-branch reform to their own higher education systems-reforms that from a European standpoint turned around the marketization of higher education-served to underline the appropriateness of the Commission's interpretation of higher education's mission in wholly vocational terms. Effectively, the strategic thrust of higher education policy in systems such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, the Flemish-speaking parts of Belgium, and Ireland showed a remarkable convergence around the notion that the construction of a Europe of higher education could move forward along these lines. Similarly, the Gravier Judgement, the setting up of student mobility schemes with a substantial budget and of transnational framework programs for research, gave the Commission immense leverage and an unprecedented ability to draw the attention of higher education to what was termed the European dimension.
SHIFTING BALANCE OF POWER BETWEEN NATIONAL AND SUPERORDINATE COMMUNITIES
The European Commission rapidly acquired the ability to mobilize higher education, a mobilization that owed much to the budgetary squeeze many universities faced from their own governments and also, as M. Guichard had argued 20 years before, to the enthusiasm of students at the prospect of studying abroad. Such leverage altered fundamentally the relationship between the Commission and the world of European higher education. It altered the balance of power between the national community and the world of higher education. Higher education was no longer a reserved domain, sealed off from Bruxelles by the intermediary role of national agencies and ministries. Mobility programs and research funding schemes, administered and funded directly from Bruxelles, opened a direct channel of access to the individual institution of higher education. Higher education became an instrument of European policy, which ran parallel to national policy and bore directly on the institutional level.
Still, the element of paradox was not wanting. Education had been brought into the Commission's activities on the grounds that a European Community, bereft of a cultural vision, could not flourish. Yet the major breakthrough in higher education had been achieved within a very different frame of reference. Agreed, it mirrored closely the shift already evident within the various national communities-namely, the triumph of the utilitarian, of higher education operating less as a cultural than as an economic institution within a "market mode." By interpreting higher education as an activity of vocational import, the Commission outflanked the member states at the very moment when national policy moved toward that same perspective. No less paradoxical, the Commission had moved forward by invoking an activity-vocational training-that had never been absent from the Founding Treaties. The cultural mission of higher education appeared strangely superfluous to constructing European higher education.
UNCOMFORTABLE REVELATIONS Yet policies developed with one purpose often reveal further shortcomings. The first student mobility programs did precisely that. ERASMUS and COMETT placed student mobility firmly on the agenda of universities across the European Community. They also revealed with devastating effectiveness that a European higher education system was at best a metaphysical abstract. Student mobility programs showed each of the national higher education systems to be an exception when viewed in terms of its neighbors. Each upheld its particular versions of educational theory, curriculum, teaching styles, definitions, and images of what the typical student ought to be (Teichler, 1985) and a splendid variety in conditions of access and admission, length of first degree study, and types of qualifications conferred. As a somewhat naive commentator later observed, more degree structures existed within the individual higher education system than there were systems of higher education in the European Community (Haug, 1999) . Mass mobility laid bare a very shocking diversity-which would have disturbed the student of comparative education not one iota but which now posed real and practical problems to the builders of a European "higher education area."
It was a sea change. Institutional characteristics that once expressed national identity, genius, and preservation were now recast as obstacles to student mobility. Because student mobility was an essential part in a strategy for socializing the younger generation and preparing it for mobility of employment within the European Community-a fundamental premise in the original Founding Treaties-differences in such matters as student fees, residentiality, variations in curricular content, and methods of student evaluation-together with a disquieting originality in the timing, distribution, and length of the academic year-were now viewed less as monuments to diversity than as examples of opacity, absence of transparency, and general agents of hindrance and obscurantism.
THE HUNT FOR SOLUTIONS
Hence, the next stage in the development of Commission policy turned around the quest for ways to attenuate such historical stumbling blocks to progress. If the period of revelation lasted from 1987 to about 1991, the period from 1991 to about 1994 was given over to the search for remedies-a task delicate in the extreme and delicate on levels both technical and political. From the technical standpoint, the establishment of a table of equivalencies for different national qualifications had been tried some 15 years earlier (Neave, 1987) . Over the years, the sheer complexity involved brought grief and frustration to many of the Commission's best minds. The principle of equivalence was abandoned, to the relief of many.
From a political standpoint, finding a way for study abroad to count toward the completion of a first degree posed equal difficulties. Without it, mobility schemes provided little incentive for students. Nevertheless, to devise such an instrument risked challenging the national communities in those essential functions of certification, qualification, and accreditation, which many defended ferociously as an inalienable part of national sovereignty. Creating a series of European diplomas was no solution, either. First, the Commission would have had to persuade the national communities to transfer, at least in part, their control over accreditation to which national authorities were deeply attached. Second, this solution had indeed been unearthed in the 1980s, although at the doctoral level. It was rejected with obloquy as devaluing established national equivalents. Finally, although higher education as a vocational undertaking figured clearly as one of the Commission's responsibilities, education remained split between Commission and member states, with the latter occasionally flicking the whip. Both educational certification and accreditation were most jealously guarded by member states.
The solution hit upon bypassed national communities. It rested on the principle that the initiative to recognize periods spent abroad as counting toward the final qualification at first degree level was a matter for the individual university. The principle of recognition was pleasingly flexible and extendable. Individual universities recognized each other's diplomas, thus opening the way for the award of so-called "dual degrees." Recognition was the first step on a long road and was incorporated into the ERASMUS scheme as a conditio sine qua non (prior condition) for universities seeking support from the Bruxelles-administered student mobility funds. Formally speaking, recognition posed no challenge to the rights of certification vested in member states. And few could deny it was driven by initiatives at the institutional level. It could be argued-and was-that the Commission merely responded to demands coming from the bottom up. What it did not solve, howeverquite on the contrary, the principle of recognition added to them immensely-were the two issues of transparency-or lack of opacity-on one hand and the credibility of such recognized awards in the market place on the other (Campbell & van der Wende, 2000) .
As each successive measure revealed new difficulties, so the solutions reached contributed to the incremental development, elaboration, and strategic advancement. Thus, the principle of recognition accumulated other issues around it as study abroad became an accepted part of the European experience for a substantial minority of students. Prime among them were instruments of transferability-a matter of especial concern because national practice in areas such as student assessment, performance, and evaluation revealed immense variation. If student mobility meant more than educational tourism and developed into a modern counterpart of the medieval peregrinatio academici (pilgrimage of the scholar) moving from one university to another across frontiers and cultures, clearly some compatible record of courses studied and levels achieved had to accompany the wandering soul. Furthermore, if individual higher education systems in Euroland were to develop a degree of complementarity with one another, the question of credit transfer, the so-called portability of student financial support-that is, the right of students to use loans granted for study in their home system to support their studies elsewhere in the European Community-were crucial. So too was the complementarity of qualifications. Although the first of these was dealt with by creating a European Credit Transfer Scheme-inspired, it has to be said, by the credit unit system in the United States-the complementarity of qualifications reopened the whole vexed issue of quality and accreditation.
HIGH TENSIONS
As student traffic across the higher education systems of the European Community grew, so the issues posed moved nearer to the heartland of the educational domain. As they did so, so the notion of higher education as simply a vocational enterprise-the legal basis for Commission initiativesrevealed its limitations. Certainly, complementarity between higher education systems could be given a jump start within that framework. But with no less certainty, it could not be completed within that same legal setting. Furthermore, the vocational thesis itself came under attack, not from member states but, more seriously, from large numbers of individual universities, which united in a cross-national campaign of protest that gathered momentum throughout 1993 and 1994. It was all the more telling precisely because organized between individual establishments. Clearly, the direct channels of funding and linkage between the institutional level and the emerging superordinate level in the European higher education community were far from being unproblematic. The object of university rage was precisely the vocational thesis itself. This narrow interpretation of the university's basic mission plus the Commission's concept of higher education solely as an instrument of policy were savaged by some of academia's best as demonstrating the European Community's fixation with economic viability to the exclusion of all else.
The protest merits our attention. First, because it reasserted the historic role of higher education-to serve a purpose and a constituency broader than employment and to reach beyond the needs of one section of the national community-to wit, employers. Second, because the protest supported the same thesis, originally voiced by the Committee of Wise Men in 1969: namely, that the cultural dimension and social cohesion deserved a greater weight in the formulation of higher education policy at a European level than had been the case hitherto. Third, because it may also be seen as evidence of a current of thought, widespread in Western Europe, which entertains grave doubts about the wisdom of higher education being wholly market driven. Fourth, and here one must confess to the virtues of hindsight, because the protest had considerable bearing on the way the Bologna Declaration itself was conceived and drawn up.
FURTHER PROGRESS
The clash between universities and Commission sounded the bell for another round of conflict over relative distribution of powers, in which member states did not hang back. Two vital questions stood in the offing. The first concerned a general revision to Commission powers associated with decision making by qualified majority, the central issue of the Maastricht Council in 1992. The second tackled the educational dimension foursquare. In effect, the Maastricht Council of Heads of State completed the final piece in the missing puzzle by providing a basis for education as a European Community responsibility (de Wit & Verhoeven, 2001 ). The de jure standing of a superordinate level of decision making in the education systems-and higher education by extension-was finally recognized, not without certain arrière-pensées on the part of certain national communities. The Commission's power to take initiatives was limited to those instances where member states could not achieve an objective on their own (Article 126). And as a second condition, only when the issue involved the quality of education was action at the European level justified (Article 127) (de Wit & Verhoeven, 2001, p. 206) .
From a legal perspective, Maastricht put the copingstone on the construction of a superordinate level in European higher education. However, if thought is propelled with a little more velocity, it becomes apparent that the essential task of education is precisely quality. Practically all issues in education from duration of studies down to the content of individual programs may be scrutinized in the light of this criterion. If Maastricht reset the boundaries around Bruxelles, those boundaries resembled more a series of marker posts than a razor-wire fence. However, to say that the superordinate community that emerged from Maastricht was a community strengthened and reinvigorated would be greatly optimistic. For what the national communities conceded with one hand, they also took back with the other. Extending the legal basis of the superordinate level in education was offset by changes in the administration of the student mobility programs-the main vehicle around which progress had been achieved and through which Bruxelles had concentrated considerable influence.
CHANGES NOMINAL AND ESSENTIAL
Changed in name the mobility programs certainly were. LEONARDO and SOCRATES replaced ERASMUS while still remaining in the pantheon of Europe's dead heroes resuscitated. The difference lay elsewhere. It lay in repatriating the administration, the distribution of funds, and the selection process for their assignment from Bruxelles to the individual member states. It remains a moot point whether the physical transfer of the allocation of mobility grants from the superordinate level to the national level ought to be seen as the national communities' yielding a more extensive mandate to the superordinate level in the Maastricht Treaty while at the same time depriving it of the means to act. Such a move may equally well be justified by arguing that the scale of the operation had become too large to be handled with efficiency on a centralized basis. In all likelihood, both motives were present, each reinforcing the other.
THREE FACES OF BOLOGNA
Let us now to turn to the Bologna Declaration. I have explored developments in the higher education systems in Europe from the standpoint of the policies emerging at the superordinate level as well as some of the reactions to them. I have done so because I do not believe an accurate assessment of the Bologna Declaration may be had without such a backdrop. Of course, one may judge that document and its contents simply within its own terms of reference. Many have done so and tend to emphasize more the technical aspects, which are certainly important. However, they tend to leave aside political and historical context, both of which are serious omissions because it is only in this setting that the declaration assumes its true significance. I will analyze the declaration from three standpoints: the technical-that is, the provisions it contains-the political, and finally the implications arising for the relationship between the two Communities that now form the referential basis for higher education policy in Euroland-the superordinate and the national.
The Technical Aspect
The central provision in the Bologna Declaration that most commentators retain (van der Wende, 2000; Westerheijden, 2001 ) is the creation of a framework for a homogeneous degree structure from the bachelor's through to the doctoral level. It applies to all higher education systems-university and nonuniversity-across the face of the European Union. Based on a 3-year first degree, followed by a master's after 5 years and a doctorate after 7 to 8 years after entry, the Bologna model reflects, as its proponents claim, an Anglo-Saxon inspiration. However, it is not the 4-year liberal arts/science structure prevalent in the United States as much as the 3-year specialist degree found in English university practice (Neave, 2001a) . It is tied in with the credit unit system developed earlier and experimented upon within the framework of the ERASMUS program under the title of the European Credit Transfer Scheme. It contains provisions for "life experience" to be taken into account, a measure necessary if lifelong learning is to take root in Euroland. Students accumulating between 180 and 240 credits within 3 or 4 years stand eligible for a first degree that, hopefully, will lead directly to employment.
Through the presentation of a homogeneous framework, Bologna seeks to resolve those issues that ERASMUS laid bare-namely, mobility and transparency, to which were added employability, competitiveness, and attractiveness as the central slogans in the package. Like the euro itself, similarity in structure ought, it is claimed, to make qualifications more "readable" to employers, more readily comparable for students, and more transparent for the rest of the world. It will make real that dream of the transferability of credits and make straight the exceedingly divergent path of national qualifications.
Like the little tailor and the seven ogres in Hans Christian Andersen's tale, the Bologna model sought at one fell swoop to bring remedy to several problematic areas. By simplifying the duration of degrees and introducing at European level what elsewhere would be called a template, 6 the signatories of the declaration reckoned to stimulate cross-national student traffic, enhance the employability of students because the comparability of qualifications across different systems would now no longer be a sore puzzle to prospective employers, and offer some degree of "customer protection" through the transparency of both degree structures and credit accumulation (Campbell & van der Wende, 2000) .
The Political Aspect
So much for the bare bones of Bologna. More interesting, however, is the political dimension. If Bologna stood as the second round in the search for solutions (the first, as I have pointed out, was carried out as an add-on exercise grouped around the ERASMUS program), it differed substantially from previous initiatives. First, the initiative came not from Bruxelles: It came from within the member states and was largely carried forward by university leadership, though obviously with the blessing of the appropriate authorities. Second (and its significance can only be wondered at), it put an end to a fundamental principle that from the outset governed the relationship between national communities and superordinate community: namely, that harmonization had no place on the education agenda. True, the word harmonization found no place in the declaration, either. The term architecture slipped in, thereby saving face if not honor. Plays with words could not conceal that both harmonization and architecture meant essentially the same thing, namely, convergence around common practices and therefore standards. A policy, hitherto stoutly resisted by member states, was now cast to the winds by academic leadership with the blessing of their respective national communities. If only for this, Bologna marked a watershed in the relations between national and superordinate communities.
It was not the only aspect to do so. Although employability of students figured as one of the six objectives Bologna set down, the declaration took the utmost care to ensure that due weight was attached to the cultural dimension. Interestingly, however, how Europe's universities should face up to international competition-a leitmotif in the declaration-was not upheld as an end in itself as much as a pointer toward a more general viability in the cultural dimension. "The vitality and efficiency of any civilisation can be measured by the general appeal that its culture has for other countries," the document stated (Commission of the European Communities, p. 17). The notion of competition as proof of cultural viability was not a simple flourish of rhetoric. Rather, it sought to accommodate the view national communities had long upheld in their dealings with the superordinate level on one hand and, on the other, to give due recognition to the arguments Europe's universities had defended with such passion 5 years earlier. If both arguments are brought together, clearly the importance of Bologna lies in the fact that by bringing together employability and competition as demonstrations of cultural vitality, the signatories sought to swing higher education policy in Euroland onto another heading. Bologna signaled a very real departure from the interpretation Bruxelles had sought to develop between 1991 and 1995, namely, the single-minded subordination of higher education to the vocational imperative.
Like any public statement, the Bologna Declaration requires decoding-a process that demands back-linkage to the salient events leading up to it and that are reflected in various phrases that otherwise remain arcane in meaning and significance. If the declaration aimed at breaking the logjam in the construction of a higher education area in Europe by outlining a cross-national framework for degree structures-the aspect of change-it also endorsed a broader and less one-sided interpretation of higher education's role in developing Europe's cultural dimension that represented continuity.
The balance between change and continuity emerges in other forms, not least in the very particular and careful assessment of the part assigned to competition as a principle of policy and as an operational consequence that followed upon creating a common frame. Not all member states were convinced of the virtues of unbridled marketization. Many still harbored second thoughts about the wisdom of unlimited competition between national communities to provide services in learning (Attali Report, 1998) . Before so divided an opinion, simply to endorse both competition and the marketization of higher education-despite the often insistent pressures from employers and industry (see IRDAC, 1994)-was almost certainly doomed to failure. Such hesitation found ready echo outside the groves of academe and had therefore an importance in the context of the wider debate in European society. Nevertheless, it would be ostrich-like in the extreme to deny competitive pressures from outside the Union, although whether they posed a dire threat or indeed no threat at all was itself the subject of considerable disagreement (Amaral, 2001; Amaral & Magalhoes, 2001; Campbell & van der Wende, 2000) .
The defense of education as a cultural good as opposed to a purchasable commodity and the consequent linkage between competition and the viability of European civilization were not driven solely by internal considerations. Certainly, the determination of national communities to have their hand on the driving wheel of policy at a European level stood clear for all to see. But external considerations and the quickening pace of internationalization could not be sealed off from the internal debate between both communities, national and superordinate. By associating competition, efficiency, and education with the cultural image of Europe, Bologna sent out other signals, destined for other constituencies and particularly those interests gathering around the issue of the commodification of education.
At this point, one should bear in mind another debate that took place earlier in another international forum where most of the member states of the European Union also participated. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, based in Paris, broached the issue of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1998. In a heated debate, France argued for the exclusion of films on the grounds that as a cultural product, films had no place in the discussion. The Bologna Declaration took a similar stance. It interpreted education to be a prime instrument in advancing Europe defined as a cultural entity and viewed competition in terms of quality in higher education rather than in terms of the price to be charged (van der Wende, 2000) .
The Evolving Relationship Between National and Superordinate Communities
Clearly, the relationship between superordinate communities and national communities now present in the higher education systems of Euroland exists under tension. Such tensions are, perhaps, inevitable given the weight of history and practice that have shaped higher education within the setting of the European nation-state for almost 190 years. Against this is the relative youth of the superordinate community. From an operational standpoint-that may be dated from the moment Bruxelles acquired the ability to attract the interest of Europe's universities, their faculty, and their students-this a short time indeed. In analyzing the shifting balance of power between each community level-national and superordinate-I have argued that despite earlier legal and political agreements, the origins of which go back some 30 years, the real effect of the superordinate community-at least in the area of higher education-is even more recent. That effect begins to make itself felt in the mid1980s. In other words, an effective superordinate community in Western Europe has been in place for slightly less than two decades.
Does the rise of the superordinate community pose a threat to the European nation-state as a referential community for the institution of higher education? The long-term significance of Bologna lies exactly in this perspective. Bologna can be presented as the nation-state community coming to the rescue of the superordinate community. To that extent, Bologna-and the successive round of meetings that took place in Salamanca (EUA, 2002) and Prague in 2001-demonstrate the vitality and ability of the various national communities to reach consensus. However, in their function as referential community, the relationship is rather more complex than the simple tale of nation-state versus Commission. Some of the reforms undertaken inside the national communities also affect the relationship between national and superordinate communities.
In what follows, I will simply note two of the most salient and their consequences for the principles that underlie the notion of referential communities. Earlier, I mentioned the rising power of subnational regions and the transferal from national government of certain key responsibilities, prime among which is funding. It is a trend visible in the United Kingdom and has, from the funding perspective, divided that area once again into its four constituent parts, assigning Higher Education Funding Councils to England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland (Osborn, 2001) . A similar step taken in Spain a decade earlier established the Autonomous Communities. In addition to funding higher education within their bailiwick, the Autonomous Communities also developed regional evaluation agencies, although whether this is a good thing has yet to be determined. Similarly, the federalization of Belgium and its division into two linguistically different provinces, each with its own ministry of education, funding, and identifiable higher education policy, adds to the weight of this trend (van Heffen, Verhoeven, & de Wit, 1999) . Strengthening the funding powers of regions and the passing of contracts with universities for services provided, although less radical, is equally visible in France and Sweden. In Germany, cultural sovereignty and thus the fundamental responsibility for shaping higher education has long been a Laender concern (Teichler & Kehm, 1998) .
If one juxtaposes the regional dimension against what was described earlier as the Guardian model of relationship, the principle that increasingly governs universities in their ties with the referential community is precisely that of proximity. It is a proximity based on direct negotiations with the interests of the immediate community without the intermediary of national authorities. To this extent, then, arguably the type of relationship underpinning universities and community in the United States and Britain is now making its way across the Channel.
Is this fragmentation of the national community a threat? Very often, what is one man's threat is another's opportunity. And the greater latitude for individual institutions to determine their own fate means effectively that Europe's universities may now consciously choose the type and level of community with which they identify. That choice now lies between
• the international community and Europe, • the national community, and • the regional community.
More than ever before, individual universities may now decide on the relative balance between these three levels in shaping their profiles as opposed to having them shaped by the national community to meet its exclusive demands. This is more than a passing comment. For one of the principles underlying the construction of a higher education area in Europe has been to enhance the choice of study for individual students. By the same token, it may be argued that within the nation-state referential community, a similar development now applies to institutions. The institution now has the choice of the level, or mix of levels, at which it operates-regional, national, or cross-national collaboration. There is, of course, one difference between the forces that extend student choice and institutional choice. The former is the work of the superordinate community and the latter is a self-denying ordinance by the various national communities in Europe.
For the individual university, the referential community is becoming more heterogeneous. And it is virtually certain that Europe's universities will accelerate along the path of differentiation. As they do so, they will certainly need new bodies to ensure accountability, answerability, and not least, their own representation across these different communities or levels within them. There are already signs this is happening, as nationally rooted agencies for evaluation and quality assurance are themselves reaching out to form crossnational ties and to exchange good practice. The establishment of a European Network of Quality Assurance Agencies in 2000 at Helsinki is not atypical of a functional agency pooling resources and developing its own cross-national coordination. In effect, Bologna undertakes much the same task for university leaders and national authorities and the so-called process is itself hardening into a regular event in the calendar of higher education policy in Europe.
ENVOI
This article has examined changes between higher education and its referential community in Western Europe in terms of the Bologna Declaration. In place of the monolithic, territorially defined referential community-the nation-state-that evolved over the past 190 years or more, the power both of a superordinate community and of subnational units is growing. A further drift in influence away from the nation-state is a possibility. Whatever the factors involved, however, they will not be rooted exclusively in Europe. Rather, they are likely to be shaped by Europe's adjustment to globalization. Even so, how Europe will respond will not be completely divorced from the historical and cultural image it has of itself. NOTES 1. Although the Humboldtian reforms of 1806 and the foundation of the Université Impériale in 1811 are the examples usually cited to illustrate this development, a good case can be made for locating its origins even earlier-to the mid-18th century in the case of Sweden or to the Josephine reforms in Austria during the later part of that same period (see, e.g., Neave, 2001a) .
2. For a more elaborate development of the concept of referential models in higher education, see Neave (1998) .
3. For a more extensive treatment of the political assumptions that lie beneath the different definitions of referential community, see Neave (2001b) .
4. This interpretation, provided by the European Court of Justice in its judgment on the Gravier case, was immensely important. In effect, the founding Treaties of Rome (1957) did not mention education as an area of Community-level responsibility. Nor was it an oversight. The then six member states retained control over education on the grounds that it had to do with national cultures, not the construction of an economic community. By contrast, vocational training did figure in the Treaties, and although little progress was made until the mid-1970s, the Commission did have legal capacity to take initiatives. By interpreting higher education as essentially training for a career, the legal basis, hitherto limited to types of secondary school and firm-based training establishments, now embraced higher learning (Brower, 1996; Neave, 1987) .
5. One example of outright blocking tactics was the incident of the "Four Blocked Dossiers," which set Denmark against Commission education policy from 1979 to 1981. Justifying its action, Denmark argued that it had acceded to the Treaties of Rome in the economic sphere. This, however, did not mean it had yielded up cultural sovereignty and more especially as it involved decisions in those areas of the school curriculum outside vocational training, narrowly defined (see Neave, 1987) .
6. This term is taken from the French maquette-a practice now abandoned but that once lay at the base of program accreditation and quality control by the appropriate ministry-in the late 1980s, the National Ministry of Education. For a description of this system, see Guin (1990) . (Oxford: Elsevier, 1998) . His latest book is Educación Superior: historia y politica. Estudios comparativos sobre la universidad contemporánea (Barcelona, Spain: Gedisa, 2001) . He is foreign associate of the National Academy of Education of the USA.
